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Abstract
The security of digital signatures depends not only on the
cryptographic strength of the digital signature algorithms
used, but also on the integrity of the platform on which the
digital signature application is running. Breach of plat-
form integrity due to unintentional or intentional malfunc-
tioning has the potential of wrongly imposing liability on,
or wrongly taking liability away from signing parties. This
problem is amplied by the fact that digital signatures may
be generated on platforms that are not under the control of
the signing party, and that there can be strong nancial
incentives for trying to manipulate the systems used for
digital signatures. In practice it is extremely difcult to
assess the integrity of a general purpose computing plat-
form, so that digital signing on such platforms in principle
is untrustworthy. This paper describes a method for ro-
bust WYSIWYS (What You See Is What You Sign) that
ensures the integrity of digital documents and their digital
signatures. This method can only be directly applied to
documents written with traditional ASCII characters. For
more advanced formatting a specic layout denition lan-
guage must dened.
1 Introduction
The concept of digital signature, rst publicly described
by Dife and Hellman (1976) in their classic paper New
directions in Cryptography, (Dife & Hellman 1976)
suggests that it is a computer-based equivalent of phys-
ical written signatures. Several standards exist for digi-
tal signatures, such as the international standards ISO/IEC
9796 (ISO/IEC 2006b) and ISO/IEC 14888 (ISO/IEC
2006a), and the US Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
(NIST 1994). It should be noted that these standards focus
on cryptographic algorithms, and not on implementation
aspects and visualisation of digital documents. The advan-
tage of the standards is to specify methods and primitives
which make digital signatures practical to implement and
efcient to execute. However, they do not focus on the
necessary integrity requirements of the implementations
and underlying platform.
Although there are similarities between handwritten
and digital signatures, there are also fundamental differ-
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ences. The main similarity is that both types of signatures
can provide evidence of authorship and authenticity of a
document. The differences are due to the radically differ-
ent nature of paper-based documents on the one hand, and
electronic documents on the other. In paper-based trans-
actions, a document consists of text printed as ink on a
piece of paper, where the text represents the information
and the paper represents the storage medium. In this way
the information and the storage medium are inseparable.
The validity of a paper-based document is authenticated
by a signature written in ink on the same piece of paper.
The signature serves as evidence of the signer’s agreement
to the text on the paper. A pen is the only instrument be-
tween the signer and the document for creating the hand
written signature. No instrument, a part from optional op-
tical glasses for improved vision, is required for verifying
hand written signatures. Both pen and glasses can be con-
sidered reliable.
For digital signatures all of this changes. Documents
are immaterial because the information is represented by
logical bits that can be stored on, and copied to, any suit-
able electronic medium, and they only become meaningful
to humans when represented through an analogue physi-
cal medium such as a computer screen or a printout. The
validity of a digital document is authenticated by verify-
ing that an immaterial digital signature logically matches
the already immaterial document. Because a digital doc-
ument in its immaterial form can not be observed directly
by the signer, the digital signature can only serve as evi-
dence of the signer’s agreement to some analogue repre-
sentation of the document, although it is usually assumed
that it represents the signer’s agreement to the immaterial
electronic document itself. Highly complex instruments
are now needed not only for viewing the document but
also for producing the digital signature.
A desirable property of digital signature systems is to
guarantee that what you see is what you sign, abbrevi-
ated as WYSIWYS. The WYSIWYS property articulates
that the bit representation of digital documents must be vi-
sualised consistently and as intended to the signer by the
digital signature system. Any violation of the WYSIWYS
property has the potential of wrongly imposing liability
on, or wrongly taking liability away from people and or-
ganisations who apply digital signatures.
To our knowledge, no currently existing system for
digital signatures is able to provide high WYSIWYS as-
surance independently of the integrity of the system used
for displaying digital documents. In general, the prop-
erty of providing WYSIWYS depends on the integrity
of the digital signature system and platform. In practice
it is extremely difcult to assess the integrity of a gen-
eral purpose computing platform, and thereby to ensure
WYSIWYS (Alsaid & Mitchell 2005, Jłsang et al. 2002,
Scheibelhoferm 2001, Kain et al. 2002, Spalka et al. 2001,
Weber 1998).
The difculty of determining the integrity of a system
from the user perspective can be seen as a security usabil-
ity problem. The failure to provide the user with suf-
cient information to determine the system’s security and
integrity is a security usability vulnerability which can be
exploited by attackers (Jłsang et al. 2007).
This problem is amplied by the fact that digital signa-
tures may be generated on platforms that are not under the
control of the signing party, and that there can be strong
nancial incentives for trying to manipulate the systems
used for digital signatures.
In case there is insufcient evidence regarding the in-
tegrity of digital signature systems and platform, they can
in principle not be trusted. This is a fundamental problem
for the practical usage of digital signatures.
This paper describes a robust method for ensuring
WYSIWYS. The method is based on using a personal
portable signature platform which for example can be em-
bedded in a mobile phone. The digital signature process
takes place on a traditional computing platform in com-
bination with the portable signature platform. In order to
forge a digitally signed document by attacking the plat-
form integrity, the attacker must compromise both the tra-
ditional computing platform and the portable signature
platform. This provides a robust digital signature system
because it is considered hard to simultaneously compro-
mise both platforms. A limitation with our method is that
it currently can only be applied to documents formatted
with simple ASCII text, but this limitation can be reduced
with a specic layout denition language.
The rest of the document is organised as follows.
Sec. 2 describes the fundamental security problems of dig-
ital signatures. Sec.3 briey reviews existing methods and
proposals for providing high WYSIWYS assurance. Sec.4
introduces our method for robust WYSIWYS. Our method
is currently only applicable to digital signatures on docu-
ments formatted with simple ASCII text. Sec.5 describes
the possibility of dening a layout formatting language
which would make our method applicable to documents
with more advanced formatting. Our method is discussed
in Sec.6, and Sec.7 concludes.
2 Security Problems with Digital Signatures
A fundamental aspect of digital documents is that display-
ing and digitally signing them are separate and unlinked
processes. In addition, the same digital document is more
often that not displayed differently by different applica-
tions on different systems. As a consequence it is difcult
to determine what exactly has been signed, both from the
signer’s and the verier’s point of view.
Digital signature systems can cause two types of er-
rors: (Arnellos et al. 2005, Jłsang et al. 2002):
• False Positive Verification of Digital Signature
A digital document which is transformed and visu-
alised differently, giving rise to different semantic in-
terpretations, although only one digital signature ap-
plies.
• False Negative Verification of Digital Signature
A bit-level alteration in the digital document which
renders the digital signature invalid, but which does
not affect the transformation, visualisation and se-
mantic interpretation of the digital document.
The source of the problem is that digital signatures
are applied at the bit level representation, whereas the se-
mantic interpretation is based on high level transformation
and analogue visualisation. This gives rise to semantic
level distance (Arnellos et al. 2005) which is introduced
by the complex systems and formats used for represent-
ing, transforming and ultimately visualising digital docu-
ments. Different document representation systems will be
characterised by different semantic distances between the
bit level representation and the visualisation, where for ex-
ample MS-Word documents have a high semantic distance
whereas bitmap images have a low semantic distance.
A digital document itself only represents a small part
of all the elements needed to visually render the digital
document. Additional elements range from the operating
system and application software to font libraries, device
drivers and even hardware and rmware.
In order to guarantee WYSIWYS on a digital signa-
ture system, the digital signature should be applied to all
these elements. Unfortunately it would be impractical to
follow this principle with current technology. Theoreti-
cally it would be possible to apply trusted computing tech-
nology (Mitchell ed.) in conjunction with digital signa-
ture technology to follow this principle. However, this
would require the trusted computing system verication to
cover the whole system, from hardware to software, which
would not be practical.
In case of digitally signing XML documents, the prin-
ciple of including as many elements as practical is fol-
lowed, as described in Sec.3.1. However, it is relatively
straightforward to manipulate other parts of a computer
system in order to change the meaning of digital docu-
ments when signed. The following example was rst de-
scribed in (Jłsang et al. 2002).
In this scenario, Clark prepares a digital document with
the following contents when displayed in Helvetica font:
On 10 February 2007, Clark borrowed from Alice the
sum of U1000.
Clark then creates a font type which is similar to Helvetica
in style, but for which the glyphs for U and $ are in-
terchanged. Clark calls this new font type Helvetica, but
we call it Helvetica′ here in order to distinguish it from
the original one. Utilities such as TrueType Font Namer
(UniTech-MyTools 2007)) exist for computing platforms
such as MS-Windows to change font type names, so that
in practice any font type can have any name. Clark sub-
stitutes the original Helvetica font type with Helvetica′ on
his computer, with the result that the document looks like:
On 10 February 2007, Clark borrowed from Alice the
sum of $1000.
Clark then borrows $1000 from Alice and digitally signs
the document. Alice is satised by visual inspection of
the document and verication of the digital signature on
Clark’s computer. Alice copies the digitally signed doc-
ument to her electronic storage medium as evidence for
Clark’s debt to her. When Alice tries to prove her case
and displays the digitally signed document in a court room
the font Helvetica′ is replaced with Helvetica, with the re-
sult that the evidence indicates a debt of U1000 instead of
$1000.
In this scenario Alice has no way of verifying that the
font type has been manipulated before signing, because
Clark’s new font carries the name she expects to see. The
court is equally unable to nd indications of malicious ma-
nipulation of the document.
This simple example illustrates the fundamental chal-
lenge in achieving the WYSIWYS goal in digital signature
systems.
3 Existing Proposals for WYSIWYS Assurance
3.1 XMLDSig
The extensible markup language (XML) can be used to
represent digital documents in the form of tagged elements
that can be composed in a tree based structure. Digital
signatures can then be applied to each element of an XML
document separately. Like XML itself this method of dig-
itally signing XML documents is specied by W3C in the
standard known as XMLDSig (Bartel et al. 2002).
A basic XML document does not carry information
about how to display the data. The correct display of
an XML document e.g. in a browser is expressed with
XML based languages specically dened for graphical
layout of documents, such as the original HTML (hyper-
text markup language), or by linking in external format-
ting documents expressed in XML based languages such
as CSS (Cascading style sheets) or the XSL (extensible
stylesheet language) family1. XSL can be used to alter the
format of XML data, either into HTML or other formats
that are suitable for a browser to display. When applying
this type of document transformation, the visualisation of
an XML document depends not only on the XML docu-
ment itself, but also on the external formatting documents.
In order to digitally sign an XML document, the sig-
nature program must also sign any such external docu-
ment, i.e. any document referred to from within the XML
document itself, as well as other formatting documents
indirectly referred to. This principle is expressed in the
XMLDSig standard as follows (Bartel et al. 2002):
Just as a user should only sign what he or she
”sees,” persons and automated mechanism that
trust the validity of a transformed document
on the basis of a valid signature should oper-
ate over the data that was transformed (includ-
ing canonicalization) and signed, not the origi-
nal pre-transformed data. This recommendation
applies to transforms specified within the sig-
nature as well as those included as part of the
document itself. For instance, if an XML docu-
ment includes an embedded style sheet [XSLT]
it is the transformed document that should be
represented to the user and signed. To meet this
recommendation where a document references
an external style sheet, the content of that exter-
nal resource should also be signed as via a sig-
nature Reference otherwise the content of that
external content might change which alters the
resulting document without invalidating the sig-
nature.
The transformation and graphical rendering of docu-
ments in this fashion obviously becomes extremely com-
plex, and complexity has always been the enemy of secu-
1The XSL family of standards consists of the following XML languages:
XSLT (XSL Transformations): for transforming XML documents,
XSL-FO (XSL Formatting Objects): for specifying the visual formatting of an
XML document,
XPath (XML Path Language): a non-XML language used by XSLT
rity. This fact is recognised in W3C’s XMLDSig standard
as follows (Bartel et al. 2002):
Some applications might operate over the orig-
inal or intermediary data but should be ex-
tremely careful about potential weaknesses in-
troduced between the original and transformed
data. This is a trust decision about the char-
acter and meaning of the transforms that an
application needs to make with caution. Con-
sider a canonicalization algorithm that normal-
izes character case (lower to upper) or charac-
ter composition (’e and accent’ to ’accented-e’).
An adversary could introduce changes that are
normalized and consequently inconsequential to
signature validity but material to a DOM pro-
cessor. For instance, by changing the case of
a character one might influence the result of an
XPath selection. A serious risk is introduced if
that change is normalized for signature valida-
tion but the processor operates over the original
data and returns a different result than intended.
The XMLDSig standard is being used for practical ap-
plications on the Internet, and also allows exible multi-
signing of XML documents (Kubbilun et al. 2005). How-
ever, the reservation expressed in the XMLDSig standard
itself indicates that this is not a technology that can pro-
vide robust WYSIWYS.
3.2 Signing Static Formats
Documents which only require the most basic typesetting
and formatting in order to be visualised can be called static
le formats. Simple ASCII text represents an example of
static format which requires relatively simple transforma-
tion for visualisation. PDF and PS documents actually
represent dynamic formats that require relatively complex
transformation in order to be visualised. Representing
documents in static formats reduces the semantic distance
between the bitmap representation and the semantic in-
terpretation, but a certain distance remains. For exam-
ple, even this approach would be vulnerable to the font
replacement attack described in Sec.2.
3.3 Signing Bitmap Formats
An approach to reducing the semantic distance between
the bit representation and the semantic interpretation even
more is to sign a bitmap transformation of the digital docu-
ment (Scheibelhoferm 2001). The font replacement attack
of Sec.2 would for example not work when the document
is visualised as bitmap.
More fundamental attacks would now be needed in or-
der to be successful. The system platform itself still cre-
ates a certain semantic distance which can be exploited.
For example malware can apply images over the displayed
bitmap document (Lefranc & Naccache 2002) so as to cre-
ate the impression that a different document is displayed.
Not even bitmap formats can reduce the semantic distance
sufciently to ensure robust WYSIWYS.
Only trusted systems for displaying digital documents
operating within highly controlled environment represents
a protection against this type of attacks, and we consider
such systems outside the scope of this study. Our focus
is on solutions that can be commercially available to most
users.
Figure 1: Components for a robust WYSIWYS system
4 The Robust WYSIWYS Solution
Our proposal is based on using standard computer systems
with document processing software and a display monitor
that can display digital documents. The display monitor
will here be called an Visual Display Unit (VDU). The
hardware and software for document processing will be
called the Document Processing Unit (DPU). The VDU
and the DPU together will be called a Document Process-
ing Platform (DPP).
The main idea of our proposal is to use a personal
portable platform that is able to convert the analogue vi-
sual representation of a document from the VDU into its
original digital representation using OCR (optical charac-
ter recognition) software. The conversion from analogue
to digital form rst requires the analogue optical image
emitted from the VDU to be captured by a digital cam-
era (DC). The bitmap representation of the analogue im-
age produced by the DC is then translated to a digital
document representation by Optical Character Recogni-
tion (OCR). The DC and the OCR are combined with a
Digital Signature Unit (DSU) that is able to generate dig-
ital signatures on digital documents. The DC, the OCR,
and the DSU together will be called the Portable Signa-
ture Platform (PSP). The combination of a DPP and the
PSP can be considered as the Robust WYSIWYS system.
The components of the Robust WYSIWYS system are il-
lustrated in Fig.1 below.
Our method for Robust WYSIWYS requires commu-
nication between the DPP and the PSP through a digital
channel, in addition to the visual channel. The user com-
municates with both units. With reference to Fig.1, the
digital signature process goes as follows.
1. The DPU transmits the digital document to the DSU.
Simultaneously, the DPU displays the document in
analogue form on the VDU.
2. The analogue visual representation of the document
is now visible for the user and for the the DC.
3. The DC captures the image displayed on the VDU
and generates a bitmap image data which is transmit-
ted to the OCR.
4. The OCR converts the bitmap image data into a dig-
ital document, which is transmitted to the DSU.
5. The DSU compares the two digital documents.
6. In case they are equal, the DSU sends a positive sig-
nal (audible, visual, physical or other) through the
user interface, indicating that the document is cor-
rectly displayed, and the DSU will allow the docu-
ment to be signed if the user decides to do so. In case
they are not equal, the DSU sends a negative signal
through the user interface, indicating that the docu-
ment is incorrectly displayed, and the DSU will not
allow a digital signature to be generated.
7. Assuming that the digital document was correctly
displayed, and that the user decides to sign the digi-
tal document, and tells the DSU to apply the digital
signature.
8. The DSU generates the digital signature.
9. The Digital Signature is transmitted to the DPU.
10. The DPU veries the digital signature.
Portable communication devices such mobile phones
are possible candidates for a PSP. In fact, most mobile
phones have integrated digital cameras, so that they al-
ready have the necessary hardware to become a DSU. The
inclusion of software for the OCR and for applying digital
signatures is all that is needed.
Commercial and open source OCR software packages
are available. In its simplest form, OCR software takes
scanned documents and converts them into text les. More
advanced graphical layout of digital documents will re-
quire a standard for geometrically formatting documents
so that the translation from analogue bitmap format to
digital document format is unambiguous. Reliable trans-
lation will also require adequate visibility conditions to
minimise optical distortion when the image is captured by
the DC.
5 Towards a Layout Definition Language
Clearly the Robust WYSIWYS system is unable to ap-
ply digital signatures to any document representation. It
would only be practical to apply digital signatures to static
documents such as containing a standard set of characters
without any advanced graphical formatting. Documents
that only contain ASCII characters could for example be
signed.
In order to allow some graphical formatting a new lay-
out specication language would have to be dened. The
fundamental requirement of such a language is that there
must always be a bijective mapping between the digital bit
representation and the analogue visual representation of a
document. This is formally expressed below.
Let d represent a document in is digital bit format, and
let a represent the same document in its analogue visual
form, e.g. as displayed on the computer screen. Let V
represent the visualisation process, i.e. the transformation
of a digital document into an analogue representation. Let
E represent the encoding of an analogue document into a
digital document. The bijectivity requirement can then be
expressed as:
d = E(V(d)) (1)
In order for our system to be applicable to documents
with higher complexity than pure ASCII, research effort is
needed for developing a layout definition language (LDL).
It would be possible to base such a language on the XML
structure, but each document would have to be a stan-




The WYSIWYS property is based on using a digital cam-
era which sees the digital document to be signed exactly
as the user sees it. The bitmap image is then converted to
the original digital document using OCR techniques. This
bridges the semantic distance between the digital docu-
ment in its binary form and the analogue visualisation of
the document. It basically guarantees that what you see is
what you sign.
While the security of the Robust WYSIWYS system
is independent of the integrity of the DPP, it does depend
on the integrity of the PSP. However, assuming that no
both the DPP and the PSP have been compromised simul-
taneously, it is possible to verify that the PSP indeed has
created the digital signature correctly. This cross check is
possible precisely because of the bijective property of the
document format.
6.1.1 Compromised PSP
Assuming that some element in the PSP has been compro-
mised to that the digital signature has been applied to the
wrong document, this fact will be noticed when the DPP
receives and veries the digital signature. It must be as-
sumed that the DPP has not been compromised. Messages
(9) and (10) in Fig.1 allows the DPU to verify the correct-
ness of the DSU’s signature. DPU will detect when the
signature has been generated over the wrong document.
6.1.2 Compromised DPP
Let us now assume that the DPU has been compromised,
so that the wrong digital document is sent in message (1).
The comparison between the received digital document
and digital document converted from the analogue image
will be detected by the DSU in step (5).
6.1.3 Simultaneous Compromise of DPP and PSP
Let us now assume that the DPU has been compromised
so that it send the wrong digital document to the DSU in
(1), and that the DSU has been compromised so that it
wrongfully indicates positive comparison in step (5). In
this case, the user will instruct the DSU to generate a dig-
ital signature over the wrong document.
It thus requires simultaneous compromise of the DPP
and the PSP in order to break the security of our system.
6.2 Possible Applications
Given the limited exibility in document formats that can
be digitally signed with our system, the applications will
also be limited. However, the simplicity and portability of
our system can make in practical in many situations.
When conducting transactions online, documents to be
digitally signed can be presented as simple frames with
minimal formatting. For example, when conducting on-
line purchase, the amount, date, name of buyer and seller
and a simple product description can be sufcient.
The product can be anything from standard consum-
ables to shares and horse race bets.
The Robust WYSIWYS solution enables people to
commit to online transactions from any terminal without
fear of applying the wrong signature because the terminal
is compromised.
6.3 Advantages and Disadvantages
The advantage of the Robust WYSIWYS method is that
the digital signature process is separated from the stan-
dard computer platforms where documents are normally
processed. Such platforms are designed with priority on
exibility and functionality, which unavoidably results in
security vulnerabilities.
The security of the Robust WYSIWYS method only
depends on either the DPP or the PSP being secure. In
fact, one of them can be compromised without causing a
risk of tricking the user into applying a digital signature
to the wrong document, so the security of our method is
totally independent of the security of the DPP. The PSP
can be designed with priority on security, and with limited
functionality and exibility. The PSP will be controlled by
the user, so she does not have to rely on systems outside
her control when digitally signing documents, even when
the documents are stored on systems outside her control.
The Robust WYSIWYS method also allows mobility
of the digital signature technology. The PSP can be a
portable device, that e.g. could be integrated with a mobile
phone. Users can then carry with them a device that al-
lows them to apply digital signatures to documents stored
on any system anywhere, as long as that system is able to
display the document, and to send it in digital format to
the PSP. This also allows for exibility and usability, as
the digital documents can be stored and processed on any
system.
The main disadvantage of the proposed method is the
limitation to simple ASCII documents. This limitation can
be reduced by developing a new document layout deni-
tion language. However the requirement of having a bi-
jective mapping between the digital and the visual rep-
resentation of documents makes it impossible to use the
rich formats of modern word processing tools and Web
page designs. In our view, digital signatures on documents
with such rich formats can never be made secure, except
by signing the raw display image bitmap. However, dig-
ital signatures on raw image bitmaps would prevent any
further processing of the digitally signed document such
as search and data mining. Digitally signatures on im-
age bitmaps would also be vulnerable to image overlay
attacks, whereas our method is resistant against such at-
tacks.
7 Conclusion
Current technologies for digital signatures have limited
trustworthiness due to the vulnerability of the comput-
ing platforms used for applying the digital signatures. We
have shown that it is possible to make the security of digi-
tal signatures independent of the security of the platform.
This is achieved by using a portable digital signature de-
vice in combination with the traditional digital signature
system. The WYSIWYS property is based on using a dig-
ital camera which sees the digital document to be signed
exactly as the user sees it. The bitmap image is then con-
verted to the original digital form using OCR techniques.
While this approach currently is limited to simple ASCII
documents, it can be made more general by specifying a
layout denition language.
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